'Dutch book' and 'strong inconsistency' are generally equivalent: there is a system of bets that makes money for the gambler, whatever the state of nature may be. As de Finetti showed, an odds-maker who is not a Bayesian is subject to a dutch book, under certain highly stylized rules of play -a fact often used as an argument against frequentists. However, so-called 'objective' or 'uninformative' priors may also be subject to a dutch book. This note explains, in a relatively simple and self-contained way, how to make dutch book against a frequently-recommended uninformative prior for covariance matrices.
Introduction
Our aim here is to sketch a relatively simple and self-contained argument to show that dutch book can be made against certain 'objective' priors, namely, invariant measures that have infinite mass and are used as 'priors' in formal Bayesian calculations. Such improper priors are often said to be 'uninformative'. Our main example involves a prior that was recommended by Jeffreys -and adopted by many Bayesians -for use in multivariate normal distributions where the covariance matrix is unknown.
To fix ideas, we begin with de Finetti's dutch-book argument against the frequentists. Let be a finite set. A bookie has to post finite, positive odds on every subset of , apart from the empty set and itself, accepting bets on each set at those odds. Bets can be laid in any amount (positive or negative) on any combination of sets. The Bayesian bookie will have a prior probability π on ,
The Main Example
Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent random p×1 vectors, with a common N p (0, ) distribution; the covariance matrix is p × p and positive definite. Here, n ≥ p > 1. An (n + 1)st observation Z will be drawn independently from N p (0, ) . How can the data X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be used to predict Z? Since the problem is invariant under multiplication by a p × p non-singular matrix A,
an invariant 'prior distribution'might suggest itself. (Quote marks are used because the prior is improper, with infinite total mass.) The invariant prior is d /| | (p+1)/2 . It is unique up to a positive constant, and can be recognized as the Jeffreys prior √ |I |d , where I is the Fisher information matrix and |M| is the determinant of M.
A predictive distribution for Z can be computed from the Jeffreys prior, by a formal application of Bayes rule. In more detail, let φ(x, z| ) be the multivariate normal density of (X, Z) given ; similarly, φ(x| ) is the multivariate normal density of X given . Here, x ∈ (R p ) n and z ∈ R p . Formally, the 'predictive density' for X, Z -in advance of data collection -is obtained by integrating against the Jeffreys prior:
Likewise, the 'predictive density' for X is
According to 'Bayes rule', the 'predictive density' for Z when X = x is
We have quote marks because the prior is improper, so
On the other hand, φ(z|x) is a proper density for Z, because φ(x, z| )dz = φ(x| ), so φ(x, z)dz = φ(x), and φ(z|x)dz = 1. The main result of this section can now be stated: the predictive density φ(z|x) is strongly inconsistent, and dutch book can be made against a statistician who uses it. (Strong inconsistency is defined below.)
The predictive distribution for Z given X 1 , . . . , X n , computed from the Jeffreys prior on the covariance matrix , is strongly inconsistent.
An outline of the proof comes next, with details in Sections 2.1 and 3. Let S = n i=1 X i X i . We take X i and Z to be p × 1 column vectors, so S is a p × p matrix. By eliminating a null set, we can take S to be positive definite. Write Z 1 for the first coordinate of Z, and S 11 for the (1,1) element of S. Then, as is almost obvious, the sampling distribution D 0 of T = Z 1 / √ S 11 does not depend on :
Here, '∼' means 'is distributed as', and t n is t with n degrees of freedom. When X = x, the predictive distribution Q(dz|x) for the (n + 1)st observation Z, computed formally by Bayes rule from the Jeffreys prior, has a density on R p given by
where C is a constant, and s = n i=1 x i x i is the value of S at the observed X = x. As before, we take x i and z to be p × 1, so x is p × n and s is p × p. The proof of (5) is 'just' calculus (Section 2.1). The constant C depends on n and p, not on x or z.
Next, the predictive distribution
as will also be proved in Section 2.1. By (4) and (6),
Inequality (7) is the key point, and strong inconsistency will soon follow.
that is why we assumed p > 1.) Let E denote expectation relative to our sampling model for X 1 , . . . , X n , Z, and recall that Q(dz|x) is the predictive distribution for Z given X = x. 'Strong inconsistency' means there is a bounded measurable function f and an > 0 with
for all x and . Section 3 discusses the definition in a more general framework, but here is the point. The left hand side of (8) depends on x not ; the right hand side, on not x. Thus,
Consider a 'lottery' that pays f (x, z) when X = x and Z = z. The expected value of the lottery, in advance of data collection, is at least β. Thus, a statistician (of the kind envisaged by de Finetti) should pay β to buy the lottery. On the other hand, after seeing X, a statistician who uses the predictive distribution Q should happily sell the lottery for α, no matter what X proves to be. The gap between α and β reflects an inconsistency in the pricing, and leaves room for dutch book against Q. Strong inconsistency is easily demonstrated, by constructing f and . In view of (7), there is a bounded measurable function h and > 0 with
, where z 1 is the first coordinate of the p × 1 column vector z, and s 11 is the (1,1) element of the p × p matrix s = n i=1 x i x i . Now (9) boils down to (8), by the change-of-variables formula for integrals. On the left hand side, D 1 is the Q(dz|x)-distribution of z 1 / √ s 11 . On the right hand side, D 0 is the sampling distribution of T = Z 1 / √ S 11 . With our f , both sides of (8) are constant, by (4) and (6). This completes a sketch of the argument for strong inconsistency. Some details are given next, and dutch book is discussed in Section 3.
Some Details
We begin with (5).
Step 1 is showing that the predictive density φ(x) of X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), computed from the model and the Jeffreys prior in advance of data collection, is C n,p /|s| n/2 , where C n,p is a constant, s = n i=1 x i x i is positive definite (a.e.), and |s| is the determinant of s. As in (2),
where φ(x| ) is the multivariate normal density,
/2 is the Jeffreys prior. As before, x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), with x i a p × 1 column vector, and is a p × p positive definite matrix. Since trace(LM) = trace(ML) when both products are defined,
Since |LM| = |ML| for p × p matrices,
So
where I p×p is the p × p identity matrix,
The first line in (12) is just (2). The second line holds by (10) and (11), with a bit of algebraic juggling for the constants. The third line holds because the Jeffreys prior µ is invariant. Equation (12) is the required formula for the predictive density φ(x) of X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ): the last integral in (12) is C n,p , the mystery constant in that density. (Computing the integral is a task not lightly to be undertaken.) This completes Step 1 in proving (5).
Step 2. The predictive density for Z when X = x is obtained from (3), as the quotient of (1) and (2). In view of (12),
This simplifies to (5), because of the identity
with w = s −1/2 z, a p × 1 column vector. To verify (14), let L rotate w into (a, 0, . . . , 0) , so LL = I p×p and a 2 = w w. The left hand side of (14) equals
This proves (14), completing the argument for (5).
We turn now to (6). Let z j be the j th coordinate of the p × 1 column vector z; recall that s 11 is the (1,1) entry of the matrix s. What is the Q(dz|x)-distribution of z 1 / √ s 11 ? When s = I p×p , the density is proportional to 1/(1 + z 1 2 ) (n−p+2)/2 , as one shows by integrating out z 2 , . . . , z p . To do the integral, set
for j = 2, . . . , p. This proves (6) when s = I p×p . Next, Q(dz|x) is the distribution q s on R p whose density is
Dependence on x is only through s = n i=1 x i x i : see (5). Abbreviate I = I p×p . Then q s is the q I -law of s 1/2 z. What remains to be seen is that
where (s 1/2 z) 1 is the first coordinate of the p × 1 column vector s 1/2 z. Claim (17) is immediate from the invariance of q I under rotation: √ s 11 is the 2 norm of the first row of s 1/2 . (Bear in mind that s 1/2 is symmetric.) Since q s is the predictive distribution for Z when X = x, the argument for (6) is complete, and with it, the proof of Theorem 1.
Estimation
We have established strong inconsistency when the Jeffreys prior is used in a multivariate normal prediction problem. A parallel -but more technical -argument yields the same conclusion in an estimation context. Here is a brief sketch; readers can skip to Section 3 without loss of continuity. Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent random p×1 vectors, with a common N p (0, ) distribution. Consider the Jeffreys prior distribution µ(d ) = d /| | (p+1)/2 . Then the formal posterior distribution for θ = −1 given X 1 , . . . , X n is Wishart:
with S = n i=1 X i X i . This is non-trivial, but can be verified starting from the fact that the Jeffreys prior µ is invariant under the transformation → −1 , by Jacobian trickery. Given S, the posterior density of θ = −1 with respect to µ is proportional to
which is the density of W (S −1 , p, n), as in Eaton (1983, p. 240) . One analog of the statistic T is
where S 11 is the (1,1) element of S −1 . When -given the data -θ has the distribution (18), then
for each S, as is immediate from the definition of the Wishart: if ζ i are iid
n). However, under the sampling model, S is W ( , p, n), and
for any , by Proposition (8.7) in Eaton (1983) . The fact that (19) and (20) are different for p > 1 leads to strong inconsistency, as before.
Strong Inconsistency is Equivalent to a Dutch Book
Our purpose here is to show that strong inconsistency is equivalent to a dutch book. A 'measurable prediction problem' consists of: (i) X ∈ X ; (ii) Z ∈ Z, which is to be predicted from X; (iii) a set of parametric models {P (dx, dz|θ) : θ ∈ } specifying the joint distribution of X and Z. Here, X and Z are measurable spaces, while X and Z are measurable functions on some underlying probability space. A 'predictive distribution' Q(dz|x) is a distribution for Z that depends on the observed value X = x. If x → Q(A|x) is measurable on X for every measurable A ⊂ Z, we will say that Q is measurable.
One way to evaluate Q involves gambling scenarios, as follows. Consider a measurable subset C ⊂ X × Z and let C x = {z : (x, z) ∈ C} be the x-section of C. Then a 'simple payoff function' is 
Any such ψ is called a 'payoff function'. Clearly,
for all x. Thus, if your predictive distribution for Z -after observing X = x -is Q(dz|x), all these payoff functions seem fair.
Definition 1. Dutch book can be made against the predictive distribution Q(dz|x) if there is a gambling system that provides a uniformly positive expected payoff to the gambler: in other words, there exists a payoff function ψ -as defined by (22) -and an > 0 such that
To paraphrase Freedman and Purves (1969) , Imagine a Master of Ceremonies who picks some θ ∈ and then draws (X, Z) from the model P (dx, dz|θ). The value of X = x is revealed and the statistician announces the predictive distribution Q(dz|x). The gambler then lays bets with payoff function ψ. When (24) holds, the gambler expects to win at least no matter what the value of θ.
Of course, if (24) holds for some positive , any other positive can be obtained by rescaling the payoff function. We will say that dutch book can be made against Q; more explicitly, dutch book can made against a bookie who -after seeing that X = x -sets odds on Z using Q(dz|x). Other language abounds: for instance, there is a dutch book; or, if Q is computed from an improper prior π, dutch book can be made against π.
In this paper, we allow only conditional bets, and obtain results on expected loss for a non-Bayesian bookie. De Finetti allowed unconditional bets (Section 1), and obtained results on actual loss. For more discussion, see Freedman and Purves (1969) or Sudderth (1994) .
Definition 2. The predictive distribution Q(dz|x) is strongly inconsistent if there exists a bounded measurable function f (x, z) and an
for all x ∈ X and θ ∈ .
Equation (8) was a special case, with θ = . We now show that Q(dz|x) is strongly inconsistent iff dutch book can made against Q. Theorem 2. Let X ∈ X , Z ∈ Z, and {P (dx, dz|θ) : θ ∈ } be a measurable prediction problem. Let Q(dz|x) be a measurable predictive distribution for Z when X = x. Then Q(dz|x) is strongly inconsistent if and only if dutch book can be made against Q.
Plainly, f 1 is a payoff function in the sense of (22). Now
the inequalities hold by (27), establishing the long-sought dutch book, namely, inequality (24) with = β−α and ψ = f 1 . This completes the proof of Theorem 2. The equivalence of strong inconsistency and dutch book also holds for estimation. To see this, just take Z = , and let Z be the identity map on . Initially, P (dx|θ) will be defined only on X ; we require some measurable structure on and set P (A × B|θ) = P (A|θ)1 B (θ) for measurable A ⊂ X and B ⊂ . A predictive distribution is a 'posterior' for θ given X = x. Quotes are needed unless Q is computed from a proper prior -but then, there are no paradoxes to discuss. Ramsey (1926) introduced the idea of betting odds as a means of assessing probability assignments. De Finetti (1931 Finetti ( , 1937 used similar ideas in his discussion of what is now commonly known as coherence. di un individuo che debba tenere un banco di scommesse su dati eventi, accettando alle stesse conditizioni qualunque scommessa nell'uno o nell'altro senso. Vedremo che egli è costretto allora a rispettare certe restrizioni, che sono i teoremi del calcolo delle probabilità. Altrimenti egli pecca di coerenza, e perde sicuramente, purchè l'avversario sappia sfruttare il suo errore. De Finetti (1931, p. 305 ).
Literature Review
In free translation, A person who is obliged to accept bets in any amount, positive or negative, on any finite combination of events, must fix prices according to the laws of probability theory. Otherwise, this person sins against coherence and loses money with certainty, provided the opponent knows how to exploit the mistake. Some time afterward, the term 'dutch book' entered the lexicon as a synonym for incoherence. The earliest cite we could find was Lehman (1955) , although use of 'dutch' as a pejorative dates back to 17th-century England. Freedman and Purves (1969) gave the dutch-book idea careful mathematical expression, for prediction and estimation, when all the spaces are finite. Rigorous treatments in a finitely additive setting for the estimation problem can be found in Sudderth (1978, 1989) . Extensions to the prediction context appear in Lane and Sudderth (1984) . Heath, Lane, and Sudderth allow infinite spaces.
Another foundational idea, 'strong inconsistency', was introduced by Stone (1976) , and later adapted to the predictive setting by Lane and Sudderth (1984) ; also see Sudderth (1993, 1999) . The equivalence of strong inconsistency and incoherence is discussed in the finitely additive setting by Lane and Sudderth (1983) . Proof in the countably additive setting is a little different (Section 3). At the risk of the obvious, strong inconsistency is an exact finite-sample property, rather than an asymptotic large-sample property.
That improper prior distributions can give rise to posterior distributions with disturbing properties has been known since at least the 1970's. Stone (1976) and the discussants of Stone's paper provide examples, including the Jeffreys prior. Eaton and Sudderth (1993 , 1998 , 1999 , 2001 , 2002 discuss invariant prediction problems, and show that in the multivariate linear model, fully invariant predictive distributions are strongly inconsistent: the 'principle of invariance' (Berger, 1985, p. 390 ) therefore leads to dutch book. The Jeffreys prior can be viewed as a prototype where elementary arguments suffice (Section 2). In contrast, much of the Eaton-Sudderth work relies on separation theorems of the Hahn-Banach type, which makes the results less accessible. Eaton and Sudderth (1999, Section 8) show that if the transformation group is amenable, there will be an invariant predictive distribution immune to dutch book -although other invariant predictive distributions will be vulnerable. If the transformation group is not amenable -like the non-singular linear transformations on R p for p > 1 in Section 2 -all invariant predictive distributions may be subject to dutch book (Eaton and Sudderth, 1998) .
The uniqueness of the invariant prior in Section 2 above is demonstrated by Eaton (1983, Example 6.19 ). Use of this prior has been suggested by Jeffreys (1961, pp. 180-81) , Box and Tiao (1973, p. 426) , Box and Tiao (1992, Section 8.2 .2), Geisser (1993, Chapter 9) , Schervish (1995, p. 122) , Keyes and Levy (1996) . The latter also has a good survey of invariant predictive distributions in multivariate analysis of variance. For an interesting generalization of (14), see Eaton (1983, p. 43) . Although incoherence is often a synonym for the possibility of a dutch book, other definitions have been suggested. See Regazzini (1987) as well as Berti, Regazzini, and Rigo (1991) . For more discussion, see Sudderth (1994, Section 7 
